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Abstract. We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in
which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint
coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is
a general polynomial-time algorithm to solve the problem for all mono-
tonic coalitional games provided that player types are known and the
number of player types is bounded by a constant. As a corollary, we ob-
tain a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an optimal partition for
weighted voting games with a constant number of weight values and for
coalitional skill games with a constant number of skills. We also consider
well-studied and well-motivated coalitional games defined compactly on
combinatorial domains. For these games, we characterize the complexity
of computing an optimal coalition structure by presenting polynomial-
time algorithms, approximation algorithms, or NP-hardness and inap-
proximability lower bounds.
1 Introduction
Coalition formation is an important issue in multiagent systems with cooperating
agents. Coalitional games have been used to model various cooperative settings
in operations research, artificial intelligence and multiagent systems (see e.g,
[5, 6, 11]). The area of coalitional game theory which studies coalition formation
has seen considerable growth over the last few decades.Given a set of agents N , a
coalitional game is defined by a valuation function v : N → R where for C ⊆ N ,
v(C) signifies the value which players in C can generate by cooperating.
In a coalitional game, a partition of the players into exhaustive and disjoint
coalitions is called a coalition structure. In the coalition structure generation
problem, the goal is to find a coalition structure pi of N that maximizes the
social welfare
∑
C∈pi v(C). We will refer to this problem of finding an optimal
coalition structure as OptCS. In this paper, we conduct a detailed investigation
of computing optimal coalition structures that give the maximum social welfare.
Computing optimal coalition structures is a natural problem in which the aim
is to utilize resources in the most efficient manner.
OptCS has received attention in the artificial intelligence community where
the focus has generally been on computing optimal coalition structures for gen-
eral coalition formation games [16, 20] without any combinatorial structure. Tra-
ditionally, the input considered is an oracle called a characteristic function which
returns the value for any given coalition (in time polynomial in the number of
players). In this setting, it is generally assumed that the value of a coalition does
not depend on players who are not in the coalition. Computing optimal coali-
tion structures is a computationally hard task because of the huge number of
coalition structures. The total number of coalition structures for a player set of
size n is Bn ∼ Θ(nn) where Bn is the nth Bell number. A number of algorithms
have been developed in the last decade which attempt to satisfy many desirable
criteria, e.g. outputting an optimal solution or a good approximation, the ability
to prune, the anytime property, worst case guarantees, distributed computation
etc. [16, 18, 20, 21]. In all of the cases, the algorithms have a worst-case time
complexity which is exponential in n. In this paper, we show that the picture
is not that bleak if player types are known and the number of player types is
bounded by a constant. In fact for such a condition, there is a polynomial-time
algorithm for OptCS for monotonic games. In many multiagent systems, it can
be reasonable to assume that the agents can be divided into a bounded number
of types according to the player attributes.
We also study the complexity of OptCS for a number of compact coalitional
games. Coalitional games can be represented compactly on combinatorial do-
mains where the valuation function is implicitly defined [9, 10]. Numerous such
classes of coalitional games have been the subject of recent research in multiagent
systems: weighted voting games [11]; skill games [5]; multiple weighted voting
games [4]; network flow games [6]; spanning connectivity games [3]; and matching
games [13]. Apart from some exceptions (skill games [7] and marginal contribu-
tion nets [17]), most of the algorithmic research for these classes of games has
been on computing stability-based solutions. In the paper, we characterize the
complexity of OptCS for many compact games by presenting polynomial-time
exact algorithms, approximation algorithms, or NP-hardness and inapproxima-
bility lower bounds. Throughout the paper, we assume familiarity with funda-
mental concepts in computational complexity [1].
Contribution In this paper, we undertake a detailed and systematic study of
computing optimal coalition structures for many important combinatorial opti-
mization coalitional games.
Our most important result is a general polynomial-time algorithm to compute
an optimal coalition structure for any monotonic coalitional game when the
player types are known and the number of player types is bounded by a fixed
constant. As a corollary, we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an
optimal coalition structure for weighted voting games with a constant number of
weight values, linear games with a constant number of desirability classes, and
all known coalitional skill games with a constant number of skills.
In contrast to our general algorithmic result, we show that finding the player
types is intractable in general from a communication and computational com-
plexity point of view.
We present a 2-approximation algorithm for the case of weighted voting
games and show that this approximation bound is the best possible. Our ap-
proximation and inapproximability results concerning weighted voting games
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may be of independent interest since they address a problem in the family of
knapsack problems [12] which has not been studied before.
We also examine well-known coalitional games based on graphs and charac-
terize the complexity of computing the optimal coalition structures. Interestingly
for certain combinatorial optimization games for which the combinatorial opti-
mization problem is NP-hard, the problem of computing an optimal coalition
structure is easy.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we define several important classes of coalitional games and
formally define the fundamental computational problem OptCS.
2.1 Coalitional games
We begin with the formal definition of a coalitional game.
Definition 1 (Coalitional games). A coalitional game is a pair (N, v) where
N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of players and v : 2N → R is a characteristic or valuation
function that associates with each coalition C ⊆ N a payoff v(C) where v(∅) =
0. A coalitional game (N, v) is monotonic when it satisfies the property that
v(C) ≤ v(D) if C ⊆ D.
Throughout the paper, when we refer to a coalitional game, we assume such a
coalitional game with transferable utility. For the sake of brevity, we will some-
times refer to the game (N, v) as simply v.
Definition 2 (Simple game). A simple game is a monotonic coalitional game
(N, v) with v : 2N → {0, 1} such that v(∅) = 0 and v(N) = 1. A coalition
C ⊆ N is winning if v(C) = 1 and losing if v(C) = 0. A minimal winning
coalition (MWC) of a simple game v is a winning coalition in which defection
of any player makes the coalition losing. A simple game can be represented by
(N,Wm), where Wm is the set of minimal winning coalitions.
For any monotonic coalitional game, one can construct a corresponding
threshold game. Threshold versions are common in the multiagent systems lit-
erature; see for instance [6, 11].
Definition 3 (Threshold versions). For each coalitional game (N, v) and
each threshold t ∈ R+, the corresponding threshold game is defined as the coali-
tional game (N, vt), where
vt(C) =
{
1 if v(C) ≥ t,
0 otherwise.
It can easily be verified that if a game (N, v) is monotonic, then for any thresh-
old t ≤ v(N), the threshold version (N, vt) is a simple game.
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2.2 Coalitional game classes
We now review a number of specific classes of coalitional games. Here we adopt
the convention that if CLASS denotes a particular class of games, we have T-
CLASS refer to the class of threshold games corresponding to games in CLASS,
i.e., for every threshold t, (N, vt) is in T-CLASS if and only if (N, v) is in CLASS.
Weighted voting games are a widely used class of monotonic games.
Definition 4 (Weighted voting games [11]). A weighted voting game
(WVG) is a simple game (N, v) for which there is a quota q ∈ R+ and a
weight wi ∈ R+ for each player i such that
v(C) = 1 if and only if
∑
i∈C
wi ≥ q.
The WVG with quota q and weights w1, . . . , wn for the players is denoted by
[q;w1, . . . , wn], where we commonly assume wi ≥ wi+1 for 1 ≤ i < n.
A multiple weighted voting game (MWVG) is the simple game (N, v) for
which there are WVGs (N, v1), . . . , (N, vm) such that
v(C) = 1 if and only if vk(C) = 1 for 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
We denote the MWVG game composed of (N, v1), . . . , (N, vm) by (N, v1 ∧ · · · ∧
vm).
Other important classes of games are defined on graphs. Among these are
spanning connectivity games, independent set games, matching games, network
flow games, and graph games, where either nodes or edges are controlled by
players and the value of a coalition of players depends on their ability to connect
the graph, enable a bigger flow, or obtain a heavier matching or edge set.
Definition 5 (Spanning connectivity game [3]). For each connected undi-
rected graph G = (V,E), we define the spanning connectivity game (SCG) on
G as the simple game (N, v) where N = E and for all C ⊆ E, v(C) = 1 if and
only if there exists some E′ ⊆ C such that T = (V,E′) is a spanning tree.
Definition 6 (Independent set game [9]). For each connected undirected
graph G = (V,E), we define the independent set game (ISG) on G as the game
(N, v) where N = V and for all C ⊆ V , v(C) is cardinality of the maximum
independent set on the subgraph of G induced on C.
Definition 7 (Matching game [13]). Let G = (V,E,w) be a weighted graph.
The matching game corresponding to G is the coalitional game (N, v) with
N = V and for each C ⊆ N , the value v(C) equals the weight of the maxi-
mum weighted matching of the subgraph induced by C.
Graph games are likewise defined on weighted graphs [10].
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Definition 8 (Graph game [10]). For a weighted graph (V,E,w), the graph
game (GG) is the coalitional game (N, v) where N = V and for C ⊆ N , v(C)
is the weight of edges in the subgraph induced by C. In this paper, we sometimes
assume that the graph corresponding to a graph game has only positive edge
weights and denote such graph games by GG+. We denote the class of graph
games where negative edge weights are allowed by GG. Note that for this latter
general class of graph games, we allow the characteristic function v to map to
negative reals.
A flow network (V,E, c, s, t) consists of a directed graph (V,E), with capacity
on edges c : E → R+, a source vertex s ∈ V , and a sink vertex t ∈ V . A network
flow is a function f : E → R+, which obeys the capacity constraints and the
condition that the total flow entering any vertex (other than s and t) equals
the total flow leaving the vertex. The value of the flow is the maximum amount
flowing out of the source.
Definition 9 (Network flow game [6]). For a flow network (V,E, c, s, t),
the associated network flow game (NFG) is the coalitional game (N, v), where
N = E and for each C ⊆ E the value v(C) is the value of the maximum flow f
with f(e) = 0 for all e ∈ E \ C.
Definition 10 (Path coalitional games). For an unweighted di-
rected/undirected graph, G = (V ∪ {s, t}, E),
– the corresponding Edge Path Coalitional Game (EPCG) is a simple coali-
tional game (N, v) such that N = E and for any C ⊆ N , v(C) = 1 if and
only if C admits an s-t path.
– the corresponding Vertex Path Coalitional Game (VPCG) is a simple coali-
tional game (N, v) such that N = V and for any C ⊆ N , v(C) = 1 if and
only if C admits an s-t path.
Finally, we define the class of skill games, which were recently introduced by
Bachrach and Rosenschein [5].
Definition 11 (Coalitional skill games [5]). A coalitional skill domain is
composed of players N , a set of tasks T = {t1, . . . , tm} and a set of skills S =
{s1, . . . , sk}. Each player i has a set of skills S(i) ⊆ S, and each task tj requires
a set of skills S(tj) ⊆ S. The set of skills a coalition C has is S(C) =
⋃
i∈C S(i).
A coalition C can perform task tj if S(tj) ⊆ S(C). The set of tasks a coalition C
can perform is T (C) = {tj | S(tj) ⊆ S(C)}. A task value function is a monotonic
function u : 2T → R. A coalitional skill game (CSG) in a coalitional skill domain
is a game (N, v) such that for all C ⊆ N , v(C) = u(t(C)). A weighted task skill
game (WTSG) is a CSG where each task tj ∈ T has a weight wj ∈ R+ and the
task value function u(T ′) =
∑
j|tj∈T ′ wj. A threshold version of WTSG can be
defined according to Definition 3.
Definition 12 (Linear games [23]). On a coalitional game (N, v), we define
the desirability relation D as follows: we say that a player i ∈ N is more
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desirable than a player j ∈ N (i D j) if for all coalitions C ∈ N\{i, j} we have
that v(C ∪ {i}) ≥ v(C ∪ {j}). The relations D (“strictly more desirable”), ∼D
(“equally desirable”), and D and ≺D (“(strictly) less desirable”) are defined in
the obvious fashion. Linear games are monotonic simple games with a complete
desirability relation, i.e. every pair of players is comparable with respect to D.
Weighted voting games form a strict subclass of linear games. A linear game on
players N = {1, . . . , n} is canonical iff ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j : i D j. A right-shift of
a coalition C is a coalition that can be obtained by a sequence of replacements
of players in C by less desirable players. A left-shift of a coalition C is defined
analogously. Canonical linear games can be represented by listing their shift-
minimal winning coalitions: minimal winning coalitions for which it holds that
any right-shift is losing. Similarly they can be represented by listing their shift-
maximal losing coalitions, defined as obvious.
2.3 Problem definition
We formally define coalition structures and OptCS.
Definition 13 (Optimal coalition structure). A coalition structure for a
game (N, v) is a partition of N . The social welfare attained by a coalition struc-
ture pi, denoted v(pi) (we overload notation), is defined as
∑
C∈pi v(C). A coali-
tion structure pi is optimal when v(pi) ≥ v(pi′) for every coalition structure pi′.
We consider the following standard computational problem in our paper.
Definition 14 (Problem OptCS). For any class of coalitional games X, and
its associated natural representation, the problem OptCS(X) is as follows: given
a coalitional game (N, v) ∈ X, compute an optimal coalition structure.
3 Games with fixed player types
We study the problem of computing an optimal coalition structure for a mono-
tonic game in the case that the number of player types is fixed. Shrot et al.
[22] considered player types and showed that some intractable problems become
tractable when only dealing with a fixed number of player types. They did not
address coalition structure generation in their paper.
Definition 15 (Player type). For a coalitional game (N, v), we call two play-
ers i, j ∈ N strategically equivalent iff for every coalition C ∈ N\{i, j} it holds
that v(C ∪ {i}) = v(C ∪ {j}). When two players i, j ∈ N are strategically equiv-
alent, we say that i and j are of the same player type.
Definition 16 (Valid type-partition). A valid type-partition for a game
(N, v) is a partition P of N such that for each player set C ∈ P , all players
in C are of the same player type.
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Let OptCS(k-types) be the problem where the goal is to compute an optimal
coalition structure for a monotonic coalitional game (N, v), given as input a
partition P of N with |P | ≤ k and the characteristic function v. Note that if all
players are different, then |P | = n. In general it is not easy to verify that a given
partition for a simple game is a valid type-partition. But under the assumption
that we are given a valid type-partition, and v is easy to compute, it turns out
that an optimal coalition structure can be computed in polynomial time.
3.1 A general algorithm
Now we will show that there exists a general polynomial-time algorithm to com-
pute an optimal coalition structure for any coalitional game when we are given
a valid type-partition with a number of player types bounded by a constant.
Our algorithm utilizes dynamic programming to compute an optimal coalition
structure provided there are a constant number of player types.
Theorem 1. There is a polynomial-time algorithm for OptCS(k-types), pro-
vided that querying v takes at most polynomial time, and the given input partition
is a valid type-partition.
Proof. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the player set and P = {T1, . . . , Tk} be the in-
put type-partition. We define coalition-types as follows: for non-negative inte-
gers t1, . . . , tk, the coalition-type T (t1, . . . , tk) is the set of coalitions {C | ∀i ∈
{1, . . . , k} : |C ∩ Ti| = ti}. In words, coalitions in coalition-type T (t1, . . . , tk)
have ti players of type Ti, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Note that v maps all coalitions of the
same coalition-type to the same value.
First our algorithm computes a table V of values for each coalition type. In
order to do this we need to query v at most nk times, since 1 ≤ ti ≤ n for all i,
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let time(v) denote the time it takes to query v, then computing V
takes O(nk·time(v)) time.
We proceed with a dynamic programming approach in order to find an opti-
mal coalition structure: Let f(a1, . . . , ak) be the optimal social welfare attained
by an optimal coalition structure on a game (N ′, v) with N ′ ∈ {N ′ | ∀i ∈
{1, . . . , k} : |N ′∩Ti| = ai}. Note that it does not matter which N ′ we choose from
this set: the choice of N ′ has no effect on the optimal social welfare since all N ′
are of the same coalition-type. We are interested in computing f(|T1|, . . . , |Tk|).
By γ(G), we signify those type-partitions which generate the same total utility
as the empty set.
Since v(∅) = 0, the following recursive definition of f(a1, . . . , ak) follows:
f(a1, . . . , ak) =

0 if ai = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
max{f(a1 − b1, . . . , a1 − bk) + v(b1, . . . , bk)
| ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} : bi ≤ ai} otherwise.
(1)
The recursive definition of f(a1, . . . , ak) directly implies a dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm. The dynamic programming approach works by filling in
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a |T1| × · · · × |Tk| table Q, where the value of f(a1, . . . ak) is stored at entry
Q[a1, . . . , ak]. Once the table has been computed, f(|T1|, . . . , |Tk|) is returned.
The entries of Q are filled in according to (1). In order to utilize (1), “lower” en-
tries are filled in first, i.e. Q[a1, . . . , ak] is filled in before Q[a′1, . . . , a
′
k] if ai ≤ a′i
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Evaluating (1) then takes O(nk) time (due to the “otherwise”-
case of (1), where the maximum of a set of at most nk elements needs to be
computed). There are O(nk) entries to be computed, so the algorithm runs in
O(nk·time(v) + n2k) time.
It is straightforward to extend this algorithm so that it (instead of outputting
only the optimal social welfare) also computes and outputs an actual coalition
structure that attains the optimal social welfare. To do so, maintain another
table |T1|×· · ·×|Tk| table R. At each point in time that some entry of Q is com-
puted, say Q[a1, . . . , ak], now we also fill in R[a1, . . . , ak]. R[a1, . . . , ak] contains
a description of a set C of coalitions such that ∑C∈C v(C) = f(a1, . . . , an) and⋃ C ∈ T (a1, . . . , ak). It suffices to describe C by simply listing the type of each
C ∈ C, and it is straightforward to verify that we can set R(a1, . . . , ak) to ∅ if
(a1, . . . , ak) ∈ γ(G), and otherwise we set R(a1, . . . , ak) to (P (a1 − b1, . . . , a1 −
bk), (b1, . . . , bk)), where (b1, . . . , bk) is the argument in the max-expression of (1).
uunionsq
3.2 Difficulty of finding types
The polynomial-time algorithm given in Theorem 1 relies on the promise that
the type-partition given in the input is valid. A natural question is now whether
it is also possible to efficiently compute the type-partition of a game in polyno-
mial time when given only the weaker promise that the number of player types
is constant k. We answer this question negatively. For randomized algorithms,
we show high communication complexity is necessary, i.e. we show that an expo-
nential amount of information is needed from the characteristic function v when
we are given no information on the structure of the characteristic function and
we rely only on querying v. In fact, the theorem states that this is the case even
when v is simple and k = 2. It should be noted that this result also holds for
deterministic algorithms, since they are a special case of randomized algorithms.
Despite this negative result, we show in Section 3.3 that we can do better for
some subclasses of monotonic games, when we are provided information on the
structure of function v.
Theorem 2. Any randomized algorithm that computes a player type-partition
when given as input a monotonic simple game (N, v) that has 2 player types,
requires at least Θ( 2
n√
n
) queries to v.
Proof. We use Yao’s minimax principle [24], which states that the expected cost
of a randomized algorithm on a given problem’s worst-case instances is at least
the lowest expected cost among all deterministic algorithms that run on any
fixed probability distribution over the problem instances.
Consider the following distribution over the input, where the player set is
N = {1, . . . , n} and n is even, the number of player types is always k = 2, and
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the given game (N, v) is simple and monotonic. Valuation v is drawn uniformly
at random from the set V = {vC | C ⊂ N, |C| = n/2} where in vC , we call C
the critical coalition. Function vC is specified as follows:
– vC(D) = 0 when |D| < n/2;
– vC(D) = 1 when |D| > n/2;
– vC(D) = 1 when D = C, i.e. D is the critical coalition;
– vC(D) = 0 otherwise.
Observe that there are exactly two player types in any instance that has non-
zero probability of being drawn under this distribution: when vC is drawn, the
type-partition is (C,N\C). Also observe that for coalitions C of size n2 , v(C) = 1
with probability 1( nn/2)
, because v is drawn uniformly at random from V .
Now let us consider an arbitrary deterministic algorithm A that computes
the type-partition for instances in this input distribution by queries to v. Let C
be the critical coalition of n/2 players such that v(C) = 1. A will have to query
v(C) in order to know which characteristic function from V has been drawn, and
thus determine the type-partition correctly. Let Q(v) be the sequence of queries
to v that A generates. Let Q′(v) be the subsequence obtained by removing from
Q(v) all queries v(D) such that |D| 6= n/2 and all queries that occur after
v(C). Because A is deterministic, the query sequence of A is the same among
all instances up to querying the critical coalition, since the critical coalitions
are the only points in which the characteristic functions of V differ from each
other. Therefore the expected length of Q′(v) is ( nn/2)/2. Because A was chosen
arbitrarily, we conclude that also the most efficient deterministic algorithm is
expected to make at least
(
n
n/2
)
/2 = Θ( 2
n√
n
) queries to v, and the theorem now
follows from Yao’s principle. uunionsq
Shrot et al. [22] showed that checking whether two players are of the same
type is NP-hard for coalitional games defined by Conitzer and Sandholm [8]. But
the games are such that even computing the value of a coalition is NP-hard. One
can say something stronger.
Proposition 1. There exists a representation of coalitional games for which
checking whether two players are of the same type is coNP-complete even if the
value of each coalition can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. A coalition C ⊆ N \ {i, j} such that v(C ∪ {i}) 6= v(D ∪ {j}) is a
polynomial-time certificate for membership in coNP. Also, it is well known that
checking whether two players in a WVG have the same Banzhaf index is coNP-
complete [15]. Since two players in a WVG are of the same type if and only if
they have same the Banzhaf index, we are done. uunionsq
3.3 Applications of Theorem 1
Theorem 2 and Proposition 1 indicate that finding player types is in general
a difficult task. Despite these negative results, Theorem 1 still applies to all
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classes of monotonic games and many natural settings where the type-partition
is implicitly or explicitly evident:
Corollary 1. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that solves
OptCS(WVG) in the following cases: 1.) in the input game (given in
weighted form), the number of distinct weights is constant; 2.) in the input game
(given in weighted form) the number of distinct weight vectors for the players is
constant.
Proof. When two players have the same weight (in the case of WVGs) or weight
vectors (in the case of MWVGs), they are strategically equivalent. Therefore we
can type-partition the players according to their weights and apply Theorem 1.
uunionsq
There exists a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the desirability
classes, when given the list of shift-minimal winning coalitions of a linear
game [2]. This immediately yields the following corollary:
Corollary 2. In the following cases, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm
that computes an optimal coalition structure for linear games with a constant
number of desirability classes: 1.) the input game is represented as a list of
(shift-)minimal winning coalitions; 2.) the input game is represented as a list of
(shift-)maximal losing coalitions;
Bachrach et al. [7] proved that OptCS(CSG) is polynomial-time solvable if
the number of tasks is constant and the ‘skill graph’ has bounded tree-width.
As a corollary of Theorem 1, we obtain a complementing positive result which
applies to all of the coalitional skill games defined in [5].
Corollary 3. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an opti-
mal coalition structure for WTSGs and T-WTSGs with at most a fixed number
of player types or a fixed number of skills.
Proof. Assume that there the number of skills is a constant k′. Then there is
a maximum of 2k
′
player types. Since skill games are monotonic, a polynomial-
time algorithm that computes an optimal coalition structure now follows from
Theorem 1. uunionsq
4 Weighted voting games and simple games
In this section, we examine weighted voting games (WVGs) and, more generally,
simple games. Weighted voting games are coalitional games widely used in multi-
agent systems and AI. We have already seen that there exists a polynomial-time
algorithm to compute an optimal coalition structure for WVGs with a constant
number of weight values. We show that if the number of weight values is not a
constant, then the problem becomes strongly NP-hard.
Proposition 2. For a WVG, checking whether there is a coalition structure that
attains social welfare k or more is NP-complete.
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Proof. We prove this by a reduction from an instance of the classical NP-hard
Partition problem to checking whether a coalition structure in a WVG gets
social welfare at least 2. An instance of the problem k-Partition is a set of
n integer weights A = {a1, . . . , an} and the question is whether it is possible
to partition A, into k subsets P1 ⊆ A,. . .Pk ⊆ A such that Pi ∩ Pj = ∅ and⋃
1≤i≤k Pi = A and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
∑
aj∈Ai aj =
∑
1≤j≤n aj/k.
Without loss of generality, assume that W =
∑
ai∈A ai is a multiple of k.
Given an instance of k-Partition I = {a1, . . . , ak}, we can transform it to a
WVG v = [q;w1, . . . , wk] where wi = ai for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and q = W/k.
Then the answer to I is yes if and only if there exists a coalition structure pi for
v such that v(pi) = k. uunionsq
Since 3-Partition is strongly NP-complete, it follows that OptCS(WVG) is
strongly NP-hard. This is contrary to the other results concerning WVGs where
computation becomes easy when the weights are encoded in unary [15]. Note
that any strongly NP-hard optimization problem with a polynomially bounded
objective function cannot have an FPTAS unless P = NP. Proposition 2 does not
discourage us from seeking an approximation algorithm for WVGs. We show
that there exists a 2-optimal polynomial-time approximation algorithm:
Proposition 3. There exists a 2-optimal polynomial-time approximation algo-
rithm for OptCS(WVG).
Proof. Consider the following algorithm: Let [q;w1, . . . , wn] be the input (so
N = {1, . . . , n}). We assume without loss of generality that wi ≤ q for all i. The
algorithm first sets p[0] := 0, and then computes for some number c the values
p[1], . . . , p[c] using the rule
p[i] :=
{
n if
∑n
k=p[i−1]+1 wk < q,
min{j | ∑jk=p[i−1]+1 wk ≥ q, (p[i− 1] + 1) ≤ j ≤ n} otherwise,
(2)
where c is taken such that p[c] = n. The algorithm outputs the coalition structure
{C1, . . . , Cc}, where for 1 ≤ i ≤ c, Ci = {p[i− 1] + 1, . . . , p[i]}.
Observe that the coalitions C1 to Cc−1 are all winning and Cc is not nec-
essarily winning, so the value of the computed coalition structure is at least
c− 1 By our assumption, the total weight of any of the coalitions C1, . . . , Cc−1
is less than 2q, and the total weight of Cc is less than q. Therefore, the total
weight of N is strictly less than q(2c−1), so the optimal social welfare is at most
2c− 2 = 2(c− 1). This is two times the social welfare of the coalition structure
computed by the algorithm. uunionsq
A tight example for the algorithm described in the proof of Theorem 3 would be
[q; q− , q− , , ], where q is a fixed constant and  is any positive real number
strictly less than q/2. On this input, the algorithm outputs a coalition structure
that attains a social welfare of 1, while the optimal social welfare is clearly 2. The
following proposition shows that there does not exist a better polynomial-time
approximation algorithm under the assumption that P 6= NP.
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Proposition 4. Unless P = NP, there exists no polynomial-time algorithm
which computes an α-optimal coalition structure for a WVG where α < 2.
Proof. We would be able to solve the NP-complete problem Partition in poly-
nomial time if there existed a (< 2)-optimal polynomial-time approximation al-
gorithm for OptCS(WVG). We could reduce a partition instance (w1, . . . , wn)
to a weighted voting game [q;w1, . . . , wn] where q =
Pn
i=1 wn
2 . Because the sum
of all weights of the players is 2q, a (< 2)-optimal approximation algorithm
would output an optimal coalition structure when provided with this instance.
The output coalition structure directly corresponds to a solution of the original
Partition instance, in case it exists. Otherwise, the social welfare attained by
the output coalition structure is 1. uunionsq
Simple games that are not necessarily weighted, and are represented by the
list of minimal winning coalitions, are even harder to approximate.
Proposition 5. OptCS(MWC), i.e. OptCS for simple games represented as
a list of minimal winning coalitions, cannot be approximated within any constant
factor unless P = NP.
Proof. This can be proved by a reduction from an instance of the classical NP-
hard maximum clique (MaxClique) problem. It is known that MaxClique
cannot be approximated within any constant factor [14].
Consider the instance I of MaxClique represented by an undirected graph
GI = (V,E). Transform I into instance I ′ = (N,Wm) of OptCS(MWC) in
the following way. Define N = {{v, v′} : v ∈ V, v′ ∈ V } to be all subsets of
V of cardinality 2. Next, set Wm = {Ci : i ∈ V }, and for all i ∈ V define
Ci = {{i, j} | {i, j} 6∈ E}. Now two coalitions Ci and Cj are disjoint if and only
if {i, j} ∈ E. Then the maximum clique size is greater than or equal to k if and
only if there is a coalition structure for (N,Wm) that attains social welfare k.
Now assume that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm which computes a
coalition structure pi which gets social welfare within a constant factor α of the
maximum possible social welfare k. Then we can use pi to get a constant-factor
approximation solution to instance I in polynomial time in the following way.
Consider the set of vertices {i : Ci ∈ pi}. Since for Ci, Cj ∈ pi, Ci and Cj are
disjoint, then we know that (i, j) ∈ E. Therefore the vertices {i : Ci ∈ pi} form
a clique of size k/α. uunionsq
5 Games on graphs
Numerous classes of coalitional games are based on graphs. We characterize the
complexity of OptCS for many of these classes in the section. We first turn
our attention to one such class for which the computation of cooperative game
solutions is well studied [10]. We see that that OptCS is computationally hard
in general for graph games:
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Proposition 6. For the general class of graph games GG, the problem OptCS
is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. We prove by presenting a reduction from the strongly NP-hard prob-
lem MaxCut. Consider an instance I of MaxCut with a connected undirected
graph G = (V,E,w) and non-negative weights w(i, j) for each edge (i, j). Let
W =
∑
(i,j)∈E w(i, j) and define P (i) as the vertices on the same side as as
vertex i. We show that if there is a polynomial-time algorithm which computes
an optimal coalition structure, then we have a polynomial-time algorithm for
MaxCut. There exists a polynomial-time reduction that reduces I to an in-
stance I ′ = (V ′, E′, w′) of OptCS for graph games where V ′ = V ∪ {x1, x2}
and E′ = E ∪ {{x1, i} : i ∈ N} ∪ {{x2, i} : i ∈ N} ∪ {{x1, x2}}. The weight
function w′ is defined as follows: w′(a, b) = −w(a, b) if a, b ∈ V , w′(a, b) = W +1
if a ∈ {x1, x2} and b ∈ V , w′(a, b) = −(|V |+ 1)W if a = x1 and b = x2.
We now show that a solution to instance I ′ of OptCS(GG) can be be used
to solve instance I of MaxCut. Assume that pi′ is an optimal coalition structure
for I ′. Then we know that pi is of the form {{x1, A′}, {x2, B′}} where (A′, B′)
is a partition of V . We also know that
∑
a/∈pi′(b) w
′(a, b) is minimized in pi′.
Therefore, we have a corresponding partition pi of V such that
∑
a/∈pi(b) w(a, b)
is maximized. uunionsq
Observation 1. It is clear that for GG+, the coalition structure containing only
the grand coalition is the optimal coalition structure.
An open question arises that if there are a constant number of player types,
can we solve OptCS for general graph games? From Lemma 3.1 of Shrot et al.
[22], we already know that identifying the player types is easy for graph games.
However, we note that the algorithm in Theorem 1 only works for monotonic
games, and with the presence of negative edges a graph game is not monotonic.
We now present some positive results concerning OptCS for other games on
graphs:
Proposition 7. OptCS(SCG) can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. For a SCG, OptCS is equivalent to computing the maximum number of
edge disjoint spanning subgraphs. Clearly, the maximum number of edge disjoint
spanning trees is greater than or equal to the maximum number of spanning
subgraphs. Since the spanning trees are also spanning subgraphs, the problem
reduces to computing the maximum number of disjoint spanning trees. The
problem is solvable in O(m2) [19]. uunionsq
Proposition 8. For EPCGs and VPCGs, OptCS can be solved in polynomial
time.
Proof. The problems are equivalent to computing the maximum number of edge
disjoint and vertex disjoint s-t paths respectively. There are well-known algo-
rithms to compute them. For example, the maximum number of edge-disjoint
s-t paths is equal to the max flow value of the graph in which each edge has unit
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capacity. The problem of maximizing the number of of vertex disjoint paths can
be reduced to maximizing the number of of vertex disjoint paths in the follow-
ing way: duplicate each vertex (apart from s and t) with one getting all ingoing
edges, and the other getting all the outgoing edges, and an internal edge between
them with the node weight as the edge weight. uunionsq
Proposition 9. The coalition structure containing only the grand coalition is
an optimal coalition structure for: 1.) NFGs and 2.) Matching games.
Proof. 1.) Assume there is a coalition structure pi of the edges which achieves
the total social welfare of s. This means that the sum of the net flow for each
E′ ∈ pi totals s. Since each member of pi is mutually exclusive, for any A,B ∈ pi,
the flows in A and B do not interact with each other. Now, consider the coalition
structure pi′ = {E} which consists of the grand coalition. Then E can achieve a
network flow of at least s by having exactly the same flows as that of pi, we know
that v(pi′) ≥ s. Therefore, the coalition structure consisting of only the grand
coalition attains a social welfare that is at least the social welfare attained by
any other coalition structure.
2.) Assume there is a coalition structure pi = {V1, . . . , Vk} of the vertices
that attains a social welfare of s. Let the maximum weighted matching of the
graph G[Vi] restricted to vertices Vi be mi. Then we know that
∑
1≤i≤kmi = s.
Since each member of pi is mutually exclusive, for any Vi, Vj ∈ pi, the matchings
in G(Vi) and G(Vj) have no intersection with each other. Now, consider the
coalition structure pi′ = {E} which consists of the grand coalition. Then V can
achieve a maximum matching of at least s by having exactly the same matchings
as that of vertex sets in pi. This implies that that v(pi′) ≥ s. Therefore, the
coalition structure consisting of only the grand coalition attains a social welfare
that is at least the social welfare attained by any other coalition structure. uunionsq
On the other hand, the threshold versions of certain games are computation-
ally harder to solve because of their similarity to WVGs [4]. As a corollary of
Prop. 4, we obtain the following:
Corollary 4. Unless P = NP, there exists no polynomial-time algorithm which
computes an α-optimal coalition structure for α < 2 and for the following classes
of games: 1. T-NFG. 2. T-Matching game and 3. T-GG+.
In some cases, OptCS may be expected to be intractable because the coali-
tional game is defined on a combinatorial optimization domain which itself is
intractable. We observe that even if computing the value of coalitions is in-
tractable, solving OptCS may be easy:
Observation 2. Given an instance of maximum independent set, graph G =
(V,E), finding the value of the coalition v(N) is NP-hard, but the optimal coali-
tion structure is all singletons.
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Game class Complexity of OptCS
Monotonic game oracle (valid type-partition & const. #types) P (Th. 1)
WVG (const no. weight values) P (Cor. 1)
(T-)WTCSGs (const. #skills or const. #types) P (Cor. 3)
WCSG (const. #tasks, bounded tree-width skill graph) P [7]
SCG P (Prop. 7)
EPCG and VPCG P (Prop. 8)
NFG and Matching Game P (Prop. 9)
Marginal Contribution Nets NP-hard [17]
GG+ P (Obs. 1)
Independent Set Game P (Obs. 2)
GG Strongly NP-hard (Prop. 6)
(N,Wm) NP-hard to approx. within const. factor (Prop. 5)
WVG Strongly NP-hard (Prop. 2);
NP-hard to approx. within factor < 2 (Prop. 4)
T-Matching; T-NFG; T-GG NP-hard to approx. within factor < 2 (Cor. 4)
CSG NP-hard even for SCSGs [7]
Table 1. Summary of complexity results for OptCS
6 Conclusions
Coalition structure generation is an active area of research in multiagent systems.
We presented a general positive algorithmic result for coalition structure genera-
tion, namely that an optimal coalition structure can be computed in polynomial
time if the player types are known and the number of player types is bounded
by a constant. In many large multiagent systems, it is a valid assumption that
there are a lot of agents but the agents can be divided into a bounded number
of strategic classes. For example, skill games are well motivated for coordinated
rescue operation settings [5, 7]. In these settings, there may be a large num-
ber of rescuers but they can be divided into a constant number of types such
as firemen, policemen and medics. We have also undertaken a detailed study
of the complexity of computing an optimal coalition structure for a number of
well-studied games and well-motivated games in AI, multiagent systems and
operations research. The results are summarized in Table 1.
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